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7. Institutions, paradigms, and tax 
evasion in developing and transition 
countries 
James Aim and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez* 
INTRODUCTION 
Although it is commonly said that the only things certain in life are death and 
taxes, it is unmistakable that taxes are in fact far from inevitable. Individuals 
do not like paying taxes, they take a variety of actions to reduce their tax 
liabilities, and in many occasions they get away with it. Some of these 
actions can be classified as tax avoidance, or the legal reduction in tax 
liabilities by practices that take full advantage of the tax code, such as income 
splitting, postponement of taxes, and tax arbitrage across income sources that 
face different treatment. Tax evasion consists of illegal and intentional 
actions taken by individuals and firms to reduce their legally due tax 
obligations, by underreporting incomes, sales or wealth, by overstating 
deductions, exemptions or credits, or by failing to file appropriate tax returns. 
For its part, government must take actions to increase compliance with the 
tax laws. 
Tax evasion is notoriously difficult to measure.' Still, there is widespread 
evidence that tax evasion is extensive and commonplace in nearly all 
countries. For the United States, the most reliable estimates suggest that the 
amount of unpaid federal individual and corporate income taxes totaled $127 
billion for 1992, with an annual growth rate of 10 percent since 1973 
(Internal Revenue Service, 19%). Evidence from a variety of methods for 
other and diverse countries, such as Argentina (Herschel, 1978), the 
Philippines (Manasan, 1988), Jamaica (Aim, Bahl and Murray, 1990; 1993), 
the Netherlands (Elffers, 1991), and Spain (de Juan et al., 1994), indicate that 
tax evasion is a pervasive and extensive phenomenon. 
Tax evasion is important for many reasons. The most obvious is that its 
presence reduces tax collections, thereby affecting taxes that compliant 
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taxpayers face and public services that citizens receive. Evasion creates 
misallocations in resource use when individuals alter their behavior to lower 
their taxes, such as in their choices of hours to work, occupations to enter, 
and investments to undertake. Its presence requires that government expend 
resources to deter non-compliance, to detect its magnitude, and to penalize its 
practitioners. Non-compliance alters the distribution of income in 
unpredictable ways. Evasion may contribute to feelings of unfair treatment 
and disrespect for the law. It affects the accuracy of macroeconomic 
statistics. More broadly, it is not possible to understand the true impact of 
taxation without recognizing the existence of tax evasion and the economic 
incidence of tax evasion (Martinez-Vazquez, 1996). 
In developing and transition countries (DTCs) in particular, tax evasion is 
often widespread and, indeed, systemic.2 Thus, the problem of tax evasion 
tends to have far more serious consequences in DTCs than in developed 
economies. 
In this chapter we examine what we have learned from the analyses of tax 
evasion, which for the most part have occurred in the context of developed 
countries, and what we can apply from these lessons to the problem of tax 
evasion in DTCs. Specifically, we examine several key issues. First, we 
present the basic analytical framework of the individual evasion decision, in 
order to study the major factors that economic theory suggests motivate 
individuals to evade — or to pay - their taxes. We argue that this basic 
framework offers some important insights but also suffers from some 
significant limitations, limitations that arise largely because of its failure to 
incorporate fully or realistically the role of societal institutions in the 
analytical framework. Second, then, we examine these institutions, and we 
argue that the existence of a 'social norm' of compliance and the presence of 
an effective but service-oriented tax administration are crucial, broadly 
defined societal institutions that influence the magnitude of tax evasion. 
Indeed, these institutions are closely linked, and jointly determine the extent 
of tax evasion. Such institutional factors are obviously important in all 
countries but are especially decisive in DTCs, and, because these institutions 
are typically so inadequate in such countries, tax evasion is typically so 
extensive there. Third, we demonstrate the importance of such institutions in 
DTCs with three case studies: in Jamaica, to demonstrate the important but 
limited role in developing countries of basic enforcement strategies like 
higher audit probabilities and penalty rates; in Africa, to demonstrate the 
crucial role of social norms in compliance decisions; and in Russia, to 
demonstrate the limited effect of administrative innovations like tax 
amnesties in a country that lacks both an effective tax administration and a 
social norm of compliance. We conclude with a discussion on how to 
improve tax compliance in DTCs. 
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMPLIANCE 
DECISION 
The standard economic approach to the analysis of tax compliance has relied 
upon the economics-of-crime methodology pioneered by Becker (1968) and 
first applied to tax compliance by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). In this 
section we first review the basic model of individual compliance behavior. 
There have been numerous extensions to the basic model, and we briefly 
discuss these extensions. This overall literature is then assessed.1 
Consider the standard model of tax evasion. In its simplest form, an 
individual is assumed to receive a fixed amount of income /, and must choose 
how much of this income to declare to the tax authorities and how much to 
under-report. The individual pays taxes at rate t on every dollar D of income 
that is declared, while no taxes are paid on under-reported income. However, 
the individual may be audited with a fixed, random probability p; if audited, 
then all under-reported income is discovered, and the individual must pay a 
penalty at rate/on each dollar that he or she was supposed to pay in taxes but 
did not pay. The individual's income Ic if caught under-reporting, equals 
Ic=I-tD-f[t(I-D)], (7.1) 
while if under-reporting is not caught, income 1N is 
IN=I~tD. (7.2) 
The individual chooses declared income to maximize the expected utility of 
the evasion gamble, or 
E U(I)=pU(Ic)+(l-p)U(IN). (7.3) 
where E is the expectation operator and utility U(I) is a function only of 
income. This optimization generates a standard first-order condition for an 
interior solution; given concavity of the utility function, the second-order 
condition will be satisfied.4'5 
Comparative statics results are easily derived. It is straightforward to 
show that an increase in the probability of detection p and the penalty rate / 
unambiguously increase declared income.6 An increase in income has an 
ambiguous effect on declared income, an effect that depends upon the 
individual's attitude toward risk.7 Surprisingly, an increase in the tax rate t 
has an ambiguous effect on declared income. A higher tax rate increases the 
return to cheating, which reduces the amount of declared income. However, 
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a higher tax rate also reduces income; if, as is usually assumed, the individual 
exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, then the lower income makes the 
evasion gamble less attractive and declared income increases accordingly 
(Yitzhaki, 1974). 
This economics-of-crime approach gives the sensible result that 
compliance depends upon enforcement. However, it is essential to recognize 
that this approach also concludes that an individual pays taxes because - and 
only because - of the economic consequences of detection and punishment.8 
Again, this is a plausible and productive insight, with the obvious implication 
that the government can encourage greater tax compliance by increasing the 
audit and the penalty rates. The many extensions of this economics-of-crime 
approach considerably complicate the theoretical analyses, and generally 
render clear-cut analytical results impossible.9 Nevertheless, they retain the 
basic approach and the basic result: individuals focus exclusively on the 
financial incentives of the evasion gamble, and individuals pay taxes solely 
because they fear detection and punishment.10 
However, it is clear to many observers that compliance cannot be 
explained entirely by such financial considerations, especially those 
generated by the level of enforcement (Graetz and Wilde, 1985; Smith and 
Kinsey, 1987; Elffers, 1991). For example, the percentage of individual 
income tax returns that are subject to a thorough tax audit is generally quite 
small in most countries, often less than 1 percent of all returns. Similarly, the 
penalty on even fraudulent evasion seldom exceeds more than the amount of 
unpaid taxes, and these penalties are infrequently imposed; civil penalties on 
non-fraudulent evasion are even smaller. A purely economic analysis of the 
evasion gamble suggests that most rational individuals should either under-
report income not subject to source withholding or overclaim deductions not 
subject to independent verification because it is extremely unlikely that such 
cheating will be caught and penalized. However, even in the least compliant 
countries evasion never rises to levels predicted by a purely economic 
analysis, and in fact there are often substantial numbers of individuals who 
apparently pay all of their taxes regardless of the financial incentives they 
face from the enforcement regime"'12 
The basic model of individual compliance behavior therefore implies that 
rational individuals should report virtually no income. Although compliance 
varies significantly across countries and across taxes, and is often quite low, 
compliance seldom falls to a level predicted by the standard economic theory 
of compliance, even in DTCs. It seems implausible that government 
enforcement activities alone can account for these levels of compliance; the 
basic model, in its reliance on expected utility theory, is certainly unable to 
explain this behavior. Indeed, the puzzle of tax compliance behavior is why 
people pay taxes, not why they evade them (Aim et al., 1992). This 
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observation suggests that the compliance decision must be affected in ways 
not captured by the basic economics-of-crime approach. 
In short, the limited ability to incorporate many relevant factors or to 
incorporate them in a meaningful way has meant that the standard theoretical 
analysis of the compliance decision is largely unable to explain the level of 
tax reporting, even when it has more success in explaining the change in 
reporting in response to policy innovations. In particular, these models 
generally imply that rational individuals should pay far less in taxes than they 
actually do. This is not a mere quibble. It goes to the heart of the basic 
model, as well as its many extensions, for explaining compliance. 
Consequently, most of the theoretical analyses that economists have produced 
in the context of developed economies give limited help in understanding the 
problem of tax evasion in DTCs. As we argue next, we believe that a 
meaningful study of tax compliance requires recognition of the important, 
perhaps decisive, role of societal institutions in the tax compliance decision. 
THE ROLE OF SOCIETAL INSTITUTIONS 
Social Norms 
A first institution is what might be termed the 'social norm' of compliance. 
Although difficult to define precisely, a social norm can be distinguished by 
the feature that it is process-oriented, unlike the outcome-orientation of 
individual rationality (Elster, 1989). A social norm therefore represents a 
pattern of behavior that is judged in a similar way by others and that therefore 
is sustained in part by social approval or disapproval. Consequently, if others 
behave according to some socially accepted mode of behavior, then the 
individual will behave appropriately; if others do not so behave, then the 
individual will respond in kind." 
The existence of a social norm suggests that an individual will comply as 
long as he or she believes that compliance is the social norm. Conversely, if 
non-compliance becomes pervasive, then the social norm of compliance 
disappears.14 It is also likely, though not without controversy, that the social 
norm of compliance differs significantly across countries. Some evidence to 
support this variation in social norms is discussed in more detail later. 
This perspective also suggests that, if government can affect the social 
norm of compliance, then such government policies represent another, 
potentially significant tool in the government's battle with tax evaders. Of 
course, policies to change the social norm of compliance are difficult to 
determine in theory. However, there is some evidence from various social 
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sciences that suggests that these norms can be affected by government 
institutions and policies. 
The role of process in individual and group decisions is becoming 
increasingly recognized. For example, there is much behavioral science 
evidence that implies that greater individual participation in the decision 
process will foster an increased level of compliance, in part because 
participation implies some commitment to the institution and such 
commitment in turn requires behavior that is consistent with words and 
actions. This notion implies that one dimension by which social norms can 
be affected is via individual participation in the decision process, say, by 
voting. Also, survey evidence suggests that compliance is higher when 
taxpayers feel that they have a voice in the way their taxes will be spent. * 
Under such circumstances, they are likely to feel more inclined to pay their -
taxes. 
Another dimension by which social norms may be affected by government 
actions is related to the level of popular support for the government program. 
Widespread support tends to legitimize the public sector, and so imposes 
some social norm to pay taxes. Consequently, it seems likely that there will 
be more tax compliance when the public good provided to a community is 
popular. Survey evidence is largely consistent with this hypothesis. 
Still another dimension by which social norms can be changed is the 
government's commitment to enforcing the tax laws. In fact, as we 
emphasize later, it seems likely that there is a constant interaction between 
social norms and tax administration. If the perception becomes widespread 
that the government is not willing to detect and penalize evaders, then such a 
perception legitimizes tax evasion. The rejection of sanctions sends a signal 
to each individual that others do not wish to enforce the tax laws and that tax 
evasion is in some sense socially acceptable, and the social norm of 
compliance disappears. Such an outcome is common in many countries, such 
as the Philippines and Italy where it seems to be accepted that tax evasion is 
the norm. The introduction of a tax amnesty may also affect the social norm 
of compliance. A tax amnesty gives individuals an opportunity to pay 
previously unpaid back-taxes without being subject to the penalties that the 
discovery of evasion normally brings. Such amnesties may reduce 
compliance if honest taxpayers resent tlje tax forgiveness given to tax cheats 
(and if individuals believe that the amnesty may be repeated again). The role 
of tax amnesties is discussed in more detail later. 
In their entirety, the various influences of the social norm of compliance 
can be classified into two basic categories. The first relates to how the 
taxpayer judges his or her own compliance behavior in light of the 
individual's own feelings about what is proper, acceptable, or moral 
behavior, what might be termed 'internal norms'. The second relates to 
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whether other taxpayers are perceived as paying their fair burden of taxes and 
to how the taxpayer feels he or she is treated by government in such areas as 
the payment of taxes, the receipt of government services, or the 
responsiveness of government decisions (or 'external norms'). 
We believe that there is considerable intuitive appeal to the potential 
importance of social norms in tax compliance behavior. There is strong 
evidence that many countries with roughly the same fiscal system exhibit far 
different patterns of compliance. There is also much survey evidence from 
many countries that indicates that compliance is strongly affected by the 
strength and commitment to the social norm of compliance.15 These surveys 
conclude, among other things, that those who comply view tax evasion as 
'immoral', that compliance is higher if a 'moral appeal' to the taxpayer is 
made by the government, that the low social standing of tax evaders can be 
an effective deterrent, that individuals with tax evaders as friends are more 
likely to be evaders themselves, and that compliance is greater in 
communities with a stronger sense of social cohesion. Other survey evidence 
suggests that some people will not pay their taxes if they dislike the way their 
taxes are spent, if they feel they have no say in the decision process, if they 
feel that the government is unresponsive to their wishes, or if they feel that 
they are treated unfairly by the government. There is also some empirical, 
experimental and simulation evidence that compliance is affected by the 
nature of the collective decision process, at least in democratic countries 
(Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann, 1989; Aim, Jackson and McKee, 1993; 
Pommerehne et at., 1994). It may well be that such sentiments play an 
important, perhaps a dominant, role in tax compliance. 
However, there is not full agreement on this issue. Tanzi and Pellechio J (1995) argue that the role of social norms in overall compliance is often 
exaggerated. In their view, given the right incentives and institutions, 
taxpayers would tend to behave the same, regardless of where they reside. 
To support their argument, they cite a number of countries (for example, 
Chile, Peru, Mexico, Uganda, Ghana) where overhauls of tax administrations 
produced significant increases in revenue collections. However, it is not 
clear that these improved performances have been sustainable (for example, 
Mexico's revenues eventually decreased) without a deeper transformation of 
the fiscal exchange between governments and taxpayers (for example, this 
may have been the case in Chile). At any rate, in our view the hypothesized 
impact of social norms on tax compliance does not contradict but rather has a 
symbiotic relationship with the strengthening and effectiveness of tax 
administration institutions in a country. 
To illustrate the ways in which a social norm might alter the analysis of 
the compliance decision, consider a slight modification of the earlier 
compliance model.16 As before, an individual member, now denoted of a 
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larger group is assumed to receive a fixed amount of income, and must 
choose the amount to declare to the tax authorities. The individual pays taxes 
on each dollar of declared income. Undeclared income is not taxed, but the 
individual may be audited with some random probability, at which point a 
fine is imposed on each dollar of unpaid taxes. Now, however, assume also 
that the total taxes paid by all individuals in the group are summed, increased 
by a multiplier m that may be greater than or less than one, and divided in 
equal shares s among all members of the group; a multiplier greater than one 
reflects the positive consumers' surplus associated with government 
provision of a public good, while a multiplier less than one implies potential 
misuse or waste in government provision. 
To simplify the analysis, assume that the individual chooses declared 
income to maximize the expected value of the evasion gamble, an approach 
that is implied by expected utility maximization when the individual is risk-
neutral. Note that the assumption of risk-neutrality is not essential for our 
analysis, but serves mainly to simplify the derivation of our results. 
The expected value EV, to individual i from the choice of declared income 
is 
EV, =/, - tD, + mst(£. Dj) - pfi(I, - D). (7.4) 
Maximization of EV, by the choice of declared income D, indicates that 
individual i will optimally report all income if 
pf + ms > /, (7.5) 
while the individual will report zero income if the inequality is reversed. The 
individual's decision here is therefore all-or-none: the individual reports 
either all income or zero income. The presence of risk-aversion modifies the 
all-or-none nature of individual behavior, without changing the basic 
comparative statics results. 
There are several ways in which the role of social norms can be introduced 
in the model of self-interested individual behavior. Perhaps the simplest way 
is suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who incorporate what they 
term a 'reference point' as a form of social norm in prospect theory. They 
assume that a loss in utility occurs if individuals do not achieve some 
reference point, a phenomenon they call 'loss aversion'. The social norm 
may be achieved by reporting all income and paying all taxes; individuals 
who declare less than their full income and pay less than their full taxes suffer 
a loss in utility. 
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More formally, assume that each individual i now maximizes E V f ,  
defined as 
where EV, is defined by equation (7.4). The individual now is assumed to 
suffer a psychological loss in expected income proportional to undisclosed 
taxes, and the coefficient y, measures as a fraction of income how much 
individual / would pay to avoid the loss associated with each dollar of 
unreported taxes. Condition (7.5) for compliance now becomes modified to 
which still allows for the deterrent effect of audits and fines but which is 
more easily satisfied than condition (7.5) (and is more easily satisfied the 
larger is y,). Clearly, yt is likely to be sensitive to the social norm of tax 
compliance. The stronger is the social norm, the more deviant the behavior 
of a non-compliant individual becomes, and the more loss the individual 
feels. Also, y, is likely to be affected by the nature of the fiscal exchange. 
In summary, the investigation of the impact of social norms on compliance 
behavior is a promising avenue of research for understanding tax evasion in 
DTCs. To the extent that these norms are influenced by the responsiveness of 
government to its citizens' needs and the effectiveness of government 
institutions, including the tax administration, the scope of government 
policies to combat tax evasion is significantly broader than that implied by 
the standard economic approach. It should not come as a surprise to many 
government officials in DTCs that controlling tax evasion will require 
improving overall governance and delivering value for money to taxpayer-
citizens. 
Tax Administration 
A second institution is the administrative machinery of the government tax 
agency. The administrative dimension of taxation has long been recognized 
by tax administrators and practitioners in a long list of country studies, and it 
has frequently been flagged by economists working on tax policy in 
developing countries (Goode, 1981; Bird, 1989; Das-Gupta and Mukhajee, 
1997). A 'tax administration' exists to ensure compliance with the tax laws, 
and much of the discussion of tax administration is consistent with the 
economics-of-crime approach discussed earlier. However, as emphasized by 
EV * = /, - ID, + mst(£. Dj)-pft(U - Dj) - y, t( / r~DJ 
= EV, — Yi t(I[-Di), (7.6) 
pf+ ms> 1 - y, (7.7) 
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Bagchi et al. (1995), it is helpful to view the tax administration process 
somewhat more broadly, as a production function in which 'inputs' like 
personnel, materials, information, laws and procedures are used to produce 
several 'outputs', the most important of which is government revenue, but 
which also includes taxpayer satisfaction, equity and social welfare. 
With these goals in mind, tax administration reform in DTCs emphasizes a 
variety of measures, including such traditional policies as: 
• Introducing an effective audit program that identifies individuals who 
do not file tax returns as well as those who under-report income or 
overclaim deductions and credits 
• Applying non-harsh penalties often and consistently 
• Using source-withholding whenever possible 
• Facilitating payments through the banking system 
• Making use of third-party sources of information to verify reporting 
behavior 
These inputs view the taxpayer as a potential criminal who must be deterred 
from cheating. 
However, it is increasingly the case that inputs are not limited to these 
traditional enforcement mechanisms. Instead, tax administrations in many 
developing countries are also introducing policies that emphasize the 
provision of taxpayer services via such things as: 
• Promoting taxpayer education and developing taxpayer services to 
assist taxpayers at every step in filing returns and paying taxes 
• Broadcasting advertisements that link taxes with government services 
• Simplifying taxes and the payment of taxes 
• Promoting voluntary compliance by lowering the costs for taxpayers 
associated with filing their taxes 
• Ensuring relative stability of the tax system 
• Adopting the general principle of self-assessment 
• Promoting a taxpayer - and a tax administrator - 'code of ethics'. 
Put differently, the taxpayer is no longer seen simply as a potential criminal 
but as a potential client. This new approach suggests a different paradigm for 
tax compliance than one that emerges ffom traditional analysis. These 
alternative paradigms are discussed next. 
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Two Paradigms 
Our discussion of social norms and tax administration suggests that two very 
different paradigms can be followed in encouraging tax compliance, each 
with very different implications for tax compliance behavior. Under the first 
paradigm, taxpayers are viewed and treated as potential criminals, and the 
emphasis is exclusively on repression of illegal behavior through frequent 
audits and stiff penalties. This has been the conventional paradigm of tax 
administrations through history, and it fits well the standard economic model 
of tax evasion based on the economic theory of crime. A second paradigm 
recognizes the role of enforcement, but also emphasizes the role of tax 
administration as a facilitator and a provider of services to taxpayer-citizens. 
This new paradigm for tax administration fits squarely with the perspective 
that emphasizes the role of social norms in tax compliance; that is, the 
government can change tax compliance by changing the social norm of tax 
compliance.17 
In fact, the most recent literature on tax administration reform for DTCs 
(Bird and Casanegra de Jantscher, 1992; Bagchi et al., 1995; Tanzi and 
Pellechio, 1995; Silvani and Baer, 1997) has largely emphasized the new 
paradigm of the role of tax administration, as a facilitator and a provider of 
services to taxpayer-citizens. Some recent administrative reforms around the 
world have also embraced this new paradigm with great success. One of the 
best examples is provided by Singapore's tax administration reform over the 
last decade (Bird and Oldman, 2000). The main tenet of Singapore's reform 
is service-oriented: the conversion from a hard-copy filing system to a 
paperless imaging system, the extensive use of electronic filing, a one-stop 
service to answer inquiries about any type of tax, the ability for filers to see 
the entire tax form with any corrections before it is submitted, the use of 
interest-free installment plans for paying taxes with direct deduction from 
bank accounts, separate functional areas within the tax administration with 
little opportunity for corruption, and a changed attitude of officials toward 
taxpayers. During the last decade, the tax administration service of 
Singapore went from being the lowest rated government agency in public 
satisfaction to one that 90 percent of the taxpayers found to provide 
courteous, competent and convenient services. Of course, most countries, 
especially those among DTCs, will not be able to imitate Singapore's reforms 
frilly. Nevertheless, there is much to be gained in improved tax compliance 
in DTCs by reforming their tax administrations along the lines of the new 
paradigm.18 
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TAX COMPLIANCE IN PRACTICE: SOME COUNTRY 
CASE STUDIES 
We have argued that the standard economic model of evasion offers some 
important insights into tax evasion, but that it also suffers from some 
significant limitations because of its failure to incorporate realistically the 
role of societal institutions such as the 'social norm' of compliance and the 
presence of an effective tax administration. These institutional factors are 
especially critical to understand tax compliance issues in DTCs. In this 
section we employ three country case studies to illustrate the importance of 
such institutions in DTCs. The Jamaica case study demonstrates the 
important but limited role in developing countries of basic enforcement 
strategies based only upon higher audit probability and penalty rates. The 
Africa case study demonstrates the crucial role of social norms in compliance 
decisions. The Russia case study demonstrates the limited effectiveness of 
isolated administrative innovations like tax amnesties in a setting that lacks 
both an effective tax administration and an accepted social norm of tax 
compliance. 
The Impact of Standard Enforcement Methods: The Case of Jamaica 
In 1983 the Government of Jamaica instituted a comprehensive reform of the 
Jamaican tax system, including the individual income tax.'9 At that time, 
income tax collections accounted for 28.9 percent of total government 
revenues and 7.6 percent of national income. Over 90 percent of these 
revenues were collected from employers withholding taxes on employee 
wages, under a Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) system. The remaining 10 percent 
of revenues came from individuals who were required to file a return upon 
which taxes on other sources of income were paid, or so-called 'self-
employed' taxpayers. Although there have been significant changes in the 
tax system since that time, the individual income tax remains a major part of 
the Jamaican system. 
In theory, the Jamaican income tax prior to reform was broad-based, with 
a high and steeply progressive rate structure that rose from a marginal tax rate 
of 30 percent on the first $J7 000 of taxable (or statutory) income to 57.5 
percent on all income above $J 14 000.:o In practice, the base of the income 
tax was substantially reduced by a variety of legal and illegal methods. 
Taxpayers could receive up to 16 credits for purposes such as participation in 
savings and insurance programs, employment of household helpers, and 
personal and family credits. A more substantial narrowing of the base was 
due to the provision to employees of non-taxable 'allowances' (or fringe 
benefits), as well as to the preferential treatment of income earned from 
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overtime activities; such overtime income was taxed at the lowest marginal 
tax rate of 30 percent, even if the individual's total income placed him or her 
in a higher marginal tax bracket. The tax base was also narrowed by tax 
evasion via under-reporting of taxable income, overclaiming of tax credits, 
and non-filing of individual income tax returns. 
Five separate payroll taxes, payable by both workers and firms, were also 
imposed on approximately the same base as the individual income tax. Of 
these five programs, three provided benefits to individuals (for example, 
disability and old-age benefits, housing subsidies, government employee 
pensions) that were related to their contributions. The combined employee 
and employer marginal tax rate in each program was constant, varying from 2 
to 5 percent. In total, these payroll taxes were quite large, roughly half of the 
revenues from the income tax, and they imposed a significant, additional 
burden on taxpayers. 
As part of the tax reform, individuals working with, and with the full 
cooperation of, the Revenue Board of the Government of Jamaica, collected 
several types of information that allowed a detailed examination of the 
individual income tax (as well as of the payroll taxes). One data set focused 
upon the responsiveness of PA YE employees to fiscal incentives (for 
example, the marginal income and payroll tax rate, the audit rate, the penalty 
rate, and the benefit rate of the payroll program) in their choice of taxable 
reported income, of legally non-taxable allowances, and of illegally 
underreported income (Aim, Bahl and Murray, 1990). Another combination 
of data sets examined self-employed taxpayers, and allowed estimation of the 
criteria by which self-employed income tax returns were selected for audit 
and the responses of these taxpayers to fiscal incentives (Aim, Bahl and 
Murray, 1993). Still another data set examined the prevalence of non-filing 
of tax returns (Aim, Bahl and Murray, 1991). Here we focus on the PAYE 
results. 
During the initial stages of the tax reform in 1984, the Revenue Board 
requested that all Jamaican firms in the PAYE sector provide information on 
compensation for each employee. By January 1985, 1345 firms had reported 
information for 69 724 workers, or 25 percent of the PAYE labor force. The 
intent of this 'PAYE Survey' was to gather information on the extent of 
employer provision of untaxed forms of compensation. Each firm gave 
information for each of its employees on taxable cash compensation and non­
taxable in-kind information; firms also provided information on taxes 
withheld and total tax credits. It was initially believed that the PAYE Survey 
provided estimates only of reported taxable income and non-taxable 
allowances. However, detailed examination of these data revealed numerous 
instances in which there were serious discrepancies between taxes actually 
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withheld and the statutory tax liability implied by tax credits and taxable 
income. In nearly all circumstances, the discrepancies were shortfalls. 
Various possible explanations for the discrepancies were explored: 
random mistakes by the employer or the Jamaican Income Tax Department, 
preferential taxation of legitimate overtime income, and correct tax liabilities 
of individuals with large but unreported business-related expenses. In all 
cases, these explanations were rejected. Instead, the most convincing 
explanation for the discrepancies was that they were due to intentional efforts 
to defraud the tax authority via tax evasion. Employees clearly had an 
incentive to get their employer to underwithhold, and employers had an 
incentive to accede to such employee requests. For a given total 
compensation cost to the firm, the employer can provide greater net 
compensation to the worker. The employer faced virtually no risk in this 
practice because by law it is the employee who would be prosecuted if 
detected. 
Cash compensation in the PAYE Survey therefore was likely to consist of 
reported taxable income and evasion compensation. Together with PAYE 
Survey information on non-taxable allowances, the Survey allowed 
estimation of the determinants of worker choice between reported income, 
evasion income and allowance income. These estimation results are 
discussed in detail by Aim, Bahl and Murray (1990). 
The dependent variables in this estimation were the shares of total 
compensation allocated to reported, evasion and allowance income. The 
explanatory variables consisted of various measures of firm size and 
indicators of firm sector. Importantly, the PAYE Survey allowed 
construction of a number of variables that influenced the 'price' of the 
different income types for each taxpayer, or the amount of gross 
compensation that must be chosen to receive one dollar of net compensation: 
the marginal income tax rate on reported income, the marginal penalty rate on 
evasion income, the marginal payroll tax rate on cash compensation, the 
marginal payroll tax benefit rate, and the (predicted) probability of detection. 
These various components were combined into a price for each type of 
income, and these prices were included as explanatory variables in each share 
equation.21 The equations were estimated by Tobit maximum likelihood 
estimation, and the estimation results are^summarized in Table 7.1. 
As shown in Table 7.1 the own-price effects are generally significant and 
of the expected (negative) sign, while the cross-price effects are symmetric 
and generally significant; that is, individuals respond predictably to changes 
in the tax, penalty, audit and benefit rates. Taken in their entirety, the 
estimated price coefficients suggest a complicated behavioral response to the 
various policy instruments. For example, an increase in the probability of 
detection will generate a negative own-price effect on the tax evasion share. 
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However, the cross-price effect on reported compensation will also be 
negative, thereby reducing the tax base, and the cross-price effect on 
allowance income will be positive. 
Importantly, however, the estimated tax base elasticities are quite small. 
The largest reported income elasticity is to a change in the marginal income 
tax rate (-0.19). The other reported income elasticities are even smaller. The 
penalty elasticity is -0.08, the payroll elasticity is 0.07, and the probability 
elasticity is only -0.01.22 
Overall, the PAYE results suggest that the enforcement regime in Jamaica, 
and perhaps in most developing and transition countries, is not a major 
deterrent to tax evasion. Relatedly, the results also suggest that very large 
discretionary changes in the policy variables are required to induce a 
significant change in taxpayer behavior; that is, even significant 
administrative reforms in enforcement of the tax laws are of limited use in 
affecting compliance decisions. Consequently, policies based upon the 
traditional punishment paradigm can affect compliance but only to a limited 
degree. 
The Role of Social Norms: The Case of Southern Africa 
Reducing tax evasion is not only a matter of applying higher penalties or 
increasing the frequency of audits. To develop policies for the reduction of 
tax evasion, it is essential to understand the behavioral aspects of the tax 
compliance decision. If individual attitudes toward tax compliance are a 
function of social norms, tax enforcement policies may have to be designed 
specifically for the culture in which they will be applied. However, the 
effects of social norms on tax compliance are not well understood, and it 
seems unlikely that analyses based upon theory or field data will be of much 
use here. In part because of the limitations of theoretical and empirical 
approaches, economists have turned increasingly to the use of experimental 
methods in the analysis of tax compliance. 
Experimental methods are particularly useful for the study of some aspects 
of the compliance decision. Unlike theoretical work, experiments are not as 
constrained by the same degree of simplification required in analytical 
studies. Unlike empirical work, experiments generate data under different 
settings in which there is control over extraneous influences; that is, the 
experimenter can hold the tax reporting institution constant (including the 
enforcement effort, the tax rate and the income levels), in order to investigate 
compliance behavior across various cultural settings. The experimental 
approach is therefore ideally suited to investigate the question of whether 
different social norms, as they arise from different societal institutions across 
countries, have a significant impact on tax compliance behavior. This section 
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reports on the results of the laboratory experiments on tax compliance 
behavior conducted by Cummings et at. (2001) in South Africa, Botswana 
and the United States, experiments designed to examine the role of social 
norms in compliance decisions. 
These experimental results provide support for the hypothesis that tax 
compliance increases with individual perceptions that the tax system is fair 
and that the government is providing valued goods and services with the 
revenues. In all of the cultural settings investigated, compliance increases 
with enforcement effort, but this is a less effective mechanism where the tax 
regime is viewed as unfair. Therefore these results provide support for a 
model of tax compliance behavior that extends well beyond the typical 
economics-of-crime approach with its exclusive emphasis on deterrence. Put 
differently, the experimental results support the view that tax enforcement 
should focus more on how taxpayers assess government services and less on 
how governments impose punitive measures. 
In order to understand the differences in social norms in Botswana, South 
Africa and the USA, it is necessary to understand the role of societal 
institutions, including tax administration and citizen attitudes toward 
government, in the three countries. Consider first tax administration. The 
self-assessment and audit processes are broadly similar across the three 
countries. However, there are varying degrees of aggressiveness in 
enforcement, and the level of development and sophistication of the tax 
enforcement apparatus also differ across the three countries. The USA has 
one of the most advanced tax administration systems in the world in its 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Botswana's tax administration system is still 
developing, and the situation in South Africa is somewhat between these 
poles. USA tax administration depends heavily on self-assessment and 
reporting of tax liabilities, along with an extensive tax withholding system. 
The audit process is generally regarded with dread on the part of the taxpayer, 
and there is a great deal of uncertainty, fostered by the IRS, surrounding the 
audit selection process and the determination of penalties. This strategy has 
been effective but not without cost. A considerable portion of the public 
backlash against the IRS has been due to the perception that the IRS is 
capricious in its enforcement precisely because the rules and penalties are not 
stated explicitly. South Africa also relies heavily on self-reporting and a 
system of withholding, and treats tax evasion as a serious crime. The South 
African tax authority, like its USA counterpart, exploits high profile cases to 
reinforce its reputation for tough enforcement. In Botswana, on the other 
hand, the attitude of the tax authority seems to be more accommodating. 
Botswana also has lower marginal tax rates, with the personal income tax 
capped at 25 percent, which is lower than the top rates in South Africa (45 
percent) and the USA (39.6 percent). 
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There are also differences in the public perception of government, the 
equity of the tax system, and the penalties imposed for evasion. In the USA 
there is a tradition of democratic decision-making, so that there is on the part 
of many a certain trust for government. However, the IRS is often viewed as 
invasive, and the tax auditing system is sometimes seen as unfair and 
capricious (Yankelovich et al., 1984). Actions of the IRS often gamer a great 
deal of negative publicity, such as that arising from its recent decision to 
audit those claiming the earned income tax credit. 
Botswana is virtually unique among African countries. Although it only 
gained independence in 1966, diamond-rich Botswana is one of Africa's 
oldest multiparty democracies, and it has successfully made the transition to 
self-governance. Several elections have been held since independence, and 
all have been quiet affairs with none of the violence or corruption that has 
accompanied elections in neighboring countries. In fact, the government of 
Botswana takes great pride in its stability, and refers to itself as the 'gem of 
Africa' in many official publications. The message here is clear: the 
government is working and working for you, and paying taxes is part of this 
social contract. 
The Botswana experience is in marked contrast with South Africa with its 
well-known history of apartheid. Indeed, the recent elections in South Africa 
have been controversial and often accompanied by violence, and both the 
white and black populations are for different reasons suspicious of the 
government. Crime rates are among the highest in the world, there is a 
widespread perception that the government is corrupt, and there is a feeling 
that the social order is somewhat fragile. In this context, the notion of a 
social norm to pay taxes is very weak. 
In sum, while the United States scores highest in government openness 
and equality, the tax system and the perception of the public sector in 
Botswana seem to be rated the highest. South Africa is rated lowest on all 
counts. 
The laboratory experiments replicate most of the elements of the basic 
structure of the personal income tax system in the three countries. Human 
subjects in a controlled laboratory are told that they should feel free to make 
as much income as possible. At the beginning of each round of the 
experiment, individuals receive income, and they must decide how much 
income to report. They pay taxes on income voluntarily reported. They do 
not pay taxes on unreported income. However, they face a probability of 
audit, and, if they are detected evading, they pay a penalty on taxes not 
reported.21 This process is repeated for a given number of rounds, and at the 
end of the experiment each subject is paid an amount that depends upon his 
or her performance during the experiment.24 The experiments are fully 
computerized, and the subjects interact with a simplified tax form on the 
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computer screen. Because the experimental setting controls for the tax rate, 
the probability of detection and the penalty rate, and because all subject pools 
are subjected to identical parameters in the three countries, the observed 
differences in tax compliance behavior are interpreted as motivated by 
differences in those institutional features that may affect attitudes toward the 
government (and by other possible factors that may capture differences in the 
social norms across the countries). 
Cummings et at. (2001) test two basic hypotheses. The first is that 
compliance levels increase as the audit probability increases and as the 
penalty rate increases. The second, and main, hypothesis focuses on 
differences in compliance behavior due to differences in social norms. Based 
upon the differential levels of development of societal institutions in the three 
countries, the second hypothesis states that compliance rates from the 
experiments will be higher in Botswana and the USA than in South Africa 
and also higher in Botswana than in the USA. 
Cummings et al. (2001) report Tobit maximum likelihood estimation 
results in which the individual compliance rate is estimated as a function of 
various explanatory variables including dummy variables for the country in 
which the experiments are performed. The basic specification introduced 
dummy variables for subject pools from Botswana and the USA with the 
control group being South Africa. Their estimation results generally 
supported the argument of a significant effect of social norms on compliance 
behavior. Compliance was higher in Botswana and in the USA than in South 
Africa, with the only exception of the USA private university pool. The 
compliance rate was also generally higher in Botswana than in the USA. It is 
important to remember that risk attitudes cannot explain compliance 
differences because all subject pools generally exhibited the same attitudes 
toward risk in a simple gamble experiment that was context-free. In 
summary, the experimental results suggested that the observed differences in 
compliance behavior are closely related to societal institutions, including the 
perception of government behavior by taxpayers and the effectiveness of tax 
administration.25 
The Effects of Tax Amnesties: The Case of the Russian Federation 
During its entire transition period, the Russian Federation has suffered from 
lagging tax collections and widespread tax evasion. The Russian tax 
authorities have attempted to reform the tax system, but have only partially 
succeeded. 
As part of its overall fiscal program, the Russian Federation has enacted a 
number of tax amnesties. This practice in Russia follows the practice in 
many countries around the world, of introducing one or more amnesties. An 
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amnesty typically allows individuals or firms to pay delinquent taxes without 
being subject to some or all of the financial and criminal penalties that the 
discovery of tax evasion normally brings. 
Tax amnesties are a controversial revenue-raising tool. Advocates of 
amnesties emphasize the immediate and short-run revenue impact, as 
individuals take advantage of the grace period to pay unpaid taxes. 
Advocates also argue that future tax compliance (and therefore future tax 
revenues) may increase if the amnesty induces individuals not on the tax rolls 
to participate, and if the amnesty is accompanied by more extensive taxpayer 
services, better education on taxpayer responsibilities, and, especially, stricter 
post-amnesty penalties for evaders and greater expenditures for enforcement. 
Critics contend that the actual experiences of many countries indicate that the 
immediate impact on revenues is almost always quite small. They also 
question the long-run impact of a tax amnesty. If honest taxpayers resent the 
special treatment of tax evaders, then their compliance may decline. Further, 
if individuals come to believe that the amnesty is not a one-time opportunity, 
then they may reduce their current compliance in anticipation of another, 
future amnesty.26 
Many of these issues have been examined, especially for state 
governments in the United States. The experiences there, as well as those in 
many other countries, suggest that amnesties are unlikely to be any kind of 
fiscal panacea, but are also unlikely to be any kind of fiscal poison. In 
particular, the available evidence indicates that a tax amnesty typically 
generates only a small amount of additional tax revenue; multiple amnesties 
are even less successful in generating additional revenues, and they have mild 
but perverse effects on voluntary compliance as taxpayers incorporate the 
expectation that future grace periods will occur. Importantly, successful 
amnesties are accompanied by administrative changes that substantially 
increase post-amnesty enforcement. An amnesty that is followed by an 
enhanced enforcement regime and improved taxpayer education generally 
increases, or at least does not decrease, voluntary tax compliance. In fact, if 
increased enforcement activities and improved organization of the tax 
administration are already planned by the tax authorities, then a tax amnesty 
may be an effective tool for easing the transition to a new, tougher tax 
regime. Such an amnesty offers several advantages: the amnesty generates 
some immediate tax revenue, individuals with past evasion are not locked 
into continued evasion, and the government both clears its ledgers of 
accounts receivables and adds the names of past evaders to its records. It is 
essential, however, that individuals believe that improved enforcement will 
occur: the government must have credibility. 
These experiences suggest that the multiple Russian amnesties would be 
irrelevant at best and counterproductive at worst. Here we discuss some 
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evidence from Aim et al. (2001) on the effects of the multiple tax amnesties 
enacted in the Russian Federation since 1993 on tax collections. 
The first amnesty was introduced on 27 October, 1993 as Presidential 
Decree No. 1773. This decree established an amnesty from 27 October to 30 
November, 1993, and stipulated that all enterprises, organizations, and 
private entrepreneurs who disclosed their unpaid taxes and tax payments for 
1993 and all proceeding years would not be liable for any sanctions on these 
unpaid liabilities. The Decree also specified that any concealed incomes 
discovered after 30 November would be penalized by the State Tax Service 
(STS) at three times the unpaid tax liability.27 As part of the amnesty, banks 
were required to provide the STS with account information. However, the 
design of the amnesty was flawed by the short period within which a taxpayer 
was allowed to disclose unpaid tax obligations, by the requirement that the 
liability be repaid within one month, and by a failure to allow for inadvertent 
or unintended mistakes. The 1993 amnesty was repealed by Presidential 
Decree 746 on 21 July, 1995. 
The next amnesty was introduced by Presidential Decree No. 65 on 19 
January, 1996 (with amendments on 22 April, 1996). Under this Decree, 
enterprises and organizations with tax arrears were allowed to defer payments 
on the arrears, provided that all current payments were made in time and in 
full. Enterprises and organizations that were granted deferments were 
required to pay 50 percent of the total amount due by October 1998, with 
payment made via quarterly payments of 5 percent of the liability; interest 
penalties were imposed at an annual rate of 30 percent on unpaid amounts. 
This Decree was widely seen by taxpayers as too burdensome. In any event, 
this amnesty was continued in somewhat modified form by Presidential 
Decree No. 685 on 8 May, 1996. Provisions of the new Decree that were 
immediately effective included such things as reduced interest penalties on 
late payments and on tax arrears and an allowance for 'technical errors' (or 
simple arithmetic mistakes) in the preparation of tax returns, all of which 
were intended to reduce the burden of tax payment and which appeared to 
introduce a true tax amnesty. 
Presidential Decree No. 65 was followed roughly a year later by Budget 
Law 29-FZ of 26 February, 1997, which established guidelines for newly 
granted deferments on taxes and other mandatory payments. Importantly, the 
Law asked that the government specify the procedures by which tax arrears 
were to be handled. These procedures emerged in Budget Law No. 42-FZ of 
26 March, 1998, and amounted to a substantial reduction in penalties on 
arrears. 
In total, given the poor quality of tax administration in the Russian 
Federation, these various amnesties and related provisions were seen by tax 
officials as an easy and attractive way of dealing with delinquent tax 
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liabilities, especially those of mounting tax arrears. However, the almost 
yearly enactment of some form of amnesty contributed to the widespread 
belief that amnesties would be a regular event. As suggested by international 
experience, a further drawback of the many amnesties was that they were not 
accompanied by substantive tax reform in the Russian Federation, at least 
until very recently (Martinez-Vazquez and Wallace, 1999). The effects of the 
amnesties on tax collections therefore emerged as a matter of some concern. 
These amnesties must be seen in the context of the overall Russian tax 
system. This tax system is a complex system of federal, state and local taxes, 
and the system has undergone change each year since 1992 (Martinez-
Vazquez and Wallace, 1999; forthcoming). In the early years, new taxes 
were introduced, most notably the value-added tax (VAT); in more recent 
years, detailed changes have regularly been made to the major taxes. The tax 
system is similar to that of developed countries in its reliance on the VAT, 
excise taxes and income taxes. However, the system lacks the sophisticated 
tax administration required to uphold the tax system. Moreover, the lack of 
comprehensive tax policy development has resulted in a system that imposes 
a myriad of taxes on businesses and individuals, thereby complicating 
compliance and lowering taxpayer confidence in the system. The resulting 
system is complex, and the multiple layers of taxes result in heavy statutory 
burdens on labor and capital income. 
Overall, revenues as a percentage of GDP fell from about 30 percent in 
1992 to around 21 percent in 1999 (Table 7.2).28 This level of tax revenues is 
not low by some international standards, and lies in the range of 'upper-
middle income countries' and above that of 'lower-middle income countries' 
(USGTA, 1999). Russia's tax effort is also quite similar to that found in the 
Baltic States. A comparison of similar statistics for total consolidated 
government tax revenues relative to GDP also demonstrates that Russia is 
close to the middle of the pack; Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Canada have higher ratios, but the United States, South Africa and Argentina 
have lower ratios. 
However, the trend of tax revenues relative to GDP is more troubling. 
This ratio fell from 1992 to 1999, and it is likely that it has continued to fall 
relative to the lower-middle and upper-middle income peer groups. It is clear 
that Russia is not generating the level of revenues that it should be producing, 
given the sophisticated statutory structure of the tax system and the high tax 
rates on certain types of income. This failure is due to problems with 
compliance and general administration of the tax system. 
The tax system in the Russian Federation is haunted by many 
characteristics of the Soviet system. Under the previous regime, taxes 
completely lacked transparency. Often, enterprises did not know what other 
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Table 7. 2 The case of the Russian Federation: tax receipts as a 
percentage of GDP (consolidated budget) 
Year 
Consolidated tax 
receipts (reported), 
as a percentage of 
GDP 
Consolidated tax receipts 
(adjusted for consistency 
over time), as a percentage 
of GDP 
Deficits 
(reported), as a 
percentage of 
GDP 
1992 29.60 26.40 18.90 
1993 28.91 23.68 7.30 
1994 29.04 23.90 10.40 
1995 22.68 22.68 6.00 
19% 22.04 22.04 8.60 
1997 22.70 22.70 7.60 
1998 20.27 20.27 8.00 
1999 21.39 21.39 1.90 (estimate) 
2000 -- 1.00 (projected) 
Sources: Ministry of Finance and GSU/USAID Fiscal Reform Project. Prior to 1995, 
budget receipts were not classified according to tax and non-tax receipts. 
taxpayers in similar circumstances paid in taxes, and the population at large 
was neither aware of taxes nor had any perceptions of tax burdens. Very few 
individuals actually filed tax returns, paid taxes during transactions, or were 
aware of the existence of turnover taxes or profit taxes. This tax system 
created a taxpayer culture of mistrust of government and of non-compliance 
that endures today. Taxpayers tend to believe that tax burdens are distributed 
arbitrarily and that the government is wasteful if not corrupt. Many taxpayers 
continue to refuse to pay taxes through non-filing of returns and under­
reporting of income. Also, negotiated taxes were the main feature of the tax 
system in the Soviet Union, and, after the years of transition, Russia's tax 
system still retains an important element of negotiation. This is most 
apparent in how settlements are reached on the payment of tax arrears, which 
are composed of delinquent payment of taxes and deferred payments as 
agreed upon between the tax authorities and taxpayers. Tax arrears are a 
pervasive fact in the Russian economy, and have had a significant impact on 
the performance of the tax system.29 Tax arrears appeared early in the 
transition, and, although their level has oscillated, their trend has been a 
clearly increasing one. By the end of 1998 tax arrears to government stood at 
R 503.1, or roughly 16 percent of GDP. By comparison, the combined tax 
collections of the federal and sub-national governments for 1998 were R 
544.1 billion (Ivanova and Wyplosz, 1999), so that existing arrears were 
roughly equal to total tax collections. While tax collections at the federal and 
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sub-national level increased by 149.3 percent between 1995 and 1998, in the 
same period tax arrears increased by 584.8 percent. 
There are multiple causes for the growth in arrears in the Russian 
Federation (Alfandari and Schaffer, 1996; Alexeev, 1998; Ivanova and 
Wyplosz, 1999). Importantly, a policy designed by the federal governments 
to combat arrears seems to have made the problem worse: the use of periodic 
tax amnesties. Each amnesty seems to have built up expectations that new 
arrears would be at least partially forgiven in the future. 
Aim et al. (2001) examine the revenue impact of these amnesties, using 
monthly data on tax collections of the Russian Federation, for the period 
January 1995 to December 1998. They focus on the enterprise profits tax 
(EPT), the value added tax (VAT), excises from a number of specific 
commodity taxes, and the total monthly revenues from these three taxes 
combined; they also calculate the total monthly revenues from all revenue 
sources, including the EPT, the VAT, and excises, plus separate taxes on 
securities, on personal income, on property, on licenses, on land, and on 
natural resources, as well as on the sum of total combined arrears and total 
revenues. 
Some initial indications of the likely effects of the amnesties on revenues 
can be seen in Figure 7.1, which shows monthly total revenues from all taxes 
plus the change in the stock of arrears. This Figure clearly shows that the 
enactment of the amnesties in 1996 and 1997 had no discernible impact on 
[~ Total revenue plus change in stock of arrears, real monthly collections 
Month/year 
Figure 7. I Total revenue plus change in stock of arrears, real monthly 
collections 
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the trends of collections in the Russian Federation. Other revenue 
breakdowns that look separately (or in combination) at the EPT, the VAT, 
and the excises similarly show no systematic effect of the amnesties. 
Aim et al. (2001) estimate the impact of the amnesties on these various 
measures of tax collections, by introducing several dummy variables to 
represent the impacts of the two amnesties introduced over their sample 
period.30 Their estimation results for each of the various taxes, as well as for 
the totals, indicate that the impact of the 19% amnesty is negative but 
insignificant, while the 1997 amnesty tends to have a positive but, again, 
insignificant effect on revenues. These empirical results are consistent with 
many other studies that find the effects of amnesties to be neither destructive 
nor benign, and often insignificant (Aim and Beck, 1993). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Tax evasion is among the most vexing problems in DTCs. Our motivation 
for this chapter has been to examine what we have learned from the analyses 
of tax evasion and what we can apply from these lessons to the problem of 
tax evasion in DTCs. Our general theme is simple and basic. Institutions 
matter everywhere, but they are especially decisive in developing and 
transition countries where their quality is generally lower than in developed 
countries. Because of the crucial role of such institutions, improving tax 
compliance in DTCs requires focusing primarily upon improving societal 
institutions. 
We examine first the standard economic model of the individual evasion 
decision, based on the economic theory of crime. We argue that this basic 
framework offers some important insights but that it also suffers from some 
significant limitations, limitations that arise largely because of its failure to 
incorporate fully or realistically the role of societal institutions in the 
analytical framework. Put differently, much of the theoretical analyses that 
economists have produced in the context of developed economies offer 
limited help in understanding the problem of tax evasion in DTCs. The 
standard analytical work generally implies that rational individuals should 
pay far less in taxes than they actually do, and this model performs much 
better at explaining the change in tax reporting in response to policy 
innovations than at explaining the level of tax reporting. 
Second, we examine the role of some specific societal institutions in 
explaining tax compliance behavior. One institution is the social norm of 
compliance. A social norm represents a pattern of behavior that is judged in 
a similar way by others and that therefore is sustained in part by social 
approval or disapproval. The existence of social norms suggests that 
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individuals will comply as long as they believe compliance is the social 
norm; conversely, if non-compliance becomes pervasive, then the social 
norm of compliance disappears. To the extent that government policies can 
affect the social norm of compliance, this provides government with 
additional means to combat tax evasion. Such government policies include 
those that work through government institutions (for example, citizen 
participation and popular support for government programs) and those that 
reflect the government's explicit commitment to enforcing the tax laws. 
However, these issues are not fully understood. The investigation of the 
impact of social norms on compliance behavior is a promising avenue of 
research for understanding tax evasion in DTCs. There is also a need to 
improve our understanding of how compliance norms are influenced by 
government policies, such as the responsiveness of government to its 
citizens' needs, improved governance, and delivering value for money to 
taxpayer-citizens. 
Another societal institution that affects tax compliance is the 
administrative machinery of the government tax agency. However, we argue 
that the traditional 'punishment paradigm' for tax administration, which treats 
taxpayers as potential criminals and puts exclusive emphasis on repression of 
illegal behavior, will be only partially effective, especially in DTCs. The 
newer 'service paradigm' recognizes the role of enforcement but also 
emphasizes the role of tax administration as a facilitator and a provider of 
services to taxpayer-citizens. This alternative paradigm is likely to be much 
more effective in improving the compliance norm in society, in part because 
it complements the role of social norms in tax compliance; that is, a service 
paradigm may well enhance the social norm of compliance. 
Third, we illustrate the importance of societal institutions for controlling 
tax evasion in DTCs by three case studies. The experience of Jamaica 
demonstrates the significant but limited role in DTCs of enforcement 
strategies exclusively based on higher audit probabilities and penalty rates. 
The results from Southern Africa strongly support the role of social norms in 
compliance decisions. The Russian case demonstrates the limited impact of 
administrative innovations like tax amnesties in a country that lacks both an 
effective tax administration and a social norm of compliance. 
In sum, we believe that societal institutions, such as the social norm of 
compliance and the presence of an effective tax administration, are critical in 
order to understand tax compliance issues in DTCs. From a policy 
viewpoint, it would appear that it may be equally important for DTCs to 
strengthen the social norms of compliance as to improve and modernize a 
service-oriented tax administration. 
In this regard, recent work by Gould (1°96) emphasizes that it is grossly 
misleading to represent a complex system by a single, so-called 
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representative agent, who behaves in some average or typical way. Instead, 
most systems have incredible variety - or a 'full house' of individual 
behaviors - and the proper understanding of any system requires recognition 
of this basic fact. Indeed, Gould (1996) argues that the way in which a 
system changes over time is attributable largely to changes in the amount of 
variation within the system, rather than to changes in some largely 
meaningless 'average' behavior across its individual members. 
This lesson is especially apt for tax compliance. People exhibit a 
remarkable diversity in their behavior. There are individuals who always 
cheat and those who always comply, some who behave as if they maximize 
the expected utility of the tax evasion gamble, others who seem to overweight 
low probabilities, individuals who respond in different ways to changes in 
their tax burden, some who are at times cooperative and at other times free-
riders, and many who seem to be guided by such things as social norms, 
moral sentiments and tax equity. Any government approach toward tax 
compliance must address this 'full house' of behaviors in devising policies to 
ensure compliance. Consequently, a government compliance strategy based 
only on detection and punishment may well be a reasonable starting point for 
tax administration but not a good ending point. Instead, what is needed is a 
multi-faceted approach that emphasizes enforcement, but that also 
emphasizes the much broader range of actual motivations that explain why 
people pay taxes. As we argue here, social norms can go a long way in 
explaining the puzzle of tax compliance, and effectively addressing tax 
evasion in DTCs will require better information on how these norms develop 
and evolve. 
NOTES 
• Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. Please address all 
correspondence to James Aim, Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy 
Studies, Georgia State University, University Plaza, Atlanta, GA 30303-3083 (Phone 404 
651-0420; Fax 404 651-4985; email jalmr4gsu.edu) We are grateful to Milka Casanegra 
de Jantscher, Richard Bird, and other conference participants for helpful comments and 
discussions. 
1. A major difficulty in analysing evasion is its measurement. See Tanzi (1980) and 
Schneider and Enste (2000) for discussions and applications of various approaches to 
measurement, all of which are subject to much imprecision and controversy. 
2. See Bird and Casanegra de Jantscher (1992) for a discussion of developing countries and 
Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2000) for transitional countries. 
3. See Cowell (1990), Andreoni el al. (1998), and Aim (2000) for comprehensive reviews of 
the compliance literature. 
Institutions, paradigms and tax evasion in developing countries 173 
4. The first- and second-order conditions are, respectively: 
cE U(I) /cD = pt (f-l) V dc) - (l-p)t U'(In) = 0 
dE U(I/ / dD1 = p [ t (f-l) f U" (Ic) + (1-P)t1 U"(ln) < 0, 
where each prime denotes a derivative. 
5. Note that the probability of detection is assumed here to be fixed and random, so that the 
audit agency is not allowed to use information from the taxpayers' returns in determining 
whom to select for audit. It seems obvious that the tax agency can do better in identifying 
tax evaders ifit uses this initial transmission of information from taxpayers than ifit simply 
ignores the information and audits all taxpayers with equal frequency. Various audit 
schemes that allow the tax agency to adjust its audit selection in light of information 
provided by the taxpayer have been introduced and analysed. See, for example, Cronshaw 
and Aim (1995). 
6. For example, total differentiation of the first-order condition demonstrates that the impact 
of a change in the probability of audit on declared income is given by: 
dDldp = -/( (f-l) V (Id + t U' (Id ]/[pt2 (f-l)2 U"(lc) + D-p) t2 U" (IN)] 
Given the second-order conditions (and the obvious requirement that f> 1), the sign of this 
expression is unambiguously positive. Other comparative statics results are similarly 
derived. 
7. The two standard measures of risk aversion are 'absolute risk aversion' A(I), equal to -
U"(I)/U'(I), and "relative risk aversion" R(l), or -IU"(1)/U'(I). It is typically assumed that 
A(I) decreases with income, while R(I) increases with income. 
8. For example, it can be shown that a risk-neutral individual will optimally choose to pay 
taxes equal only to the expected value of the penalty on unreported income. See Aim 
(2000) for further discussion. 
9. For example, if the basic model is expanded by assuming that individuals can 
simultaneously use two strategies to evade taxes (underreporting income and overstating 
deductions), then it is no longer possible to predict that increased penalties or probabilities 
of detection will reduce evasion. See Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (1995). 
10. See Cowell (1990), Andreoni et al. (1998) and Aim (2000) for discussions of these many 
studies. There has also been some work carried out to expand the basic model of individual 
choice by introducing some aspects of behavior or motivation considered explicitly by 
other social sciences, such as 'overweighting' of low probabilities, 'reference point' effects, 
deviancy, personal and situational characteristics, social contexts and attribution theory. 
See Smith and Kinsey (1987) and Webley et al. (1991) for discussions and evaluations of 
many of these alternative theories. 
11. This problem with expected utility theory — that it is unable to explain adequately the 
behavior of many taxpayers — is not limited to its tax compliance incarnation. Such 
anomalous behavior has frequently been found in many other areas of choice under 
uncertainty, particularly in those areas that involve low probability-high loss events (such 
as natural disasters), or in those areas where the decisions of individuals are interdependent 
and repeated (for example, voluntary public good provision). Machina (1987) documents 
evidence showing that individuals do not typically behave in ways consistent with expected 
utility theory. 
12. This dilemma can be illustrated more precisely, using the standard model of the individual 
compliance decision. Suppose that the utility function of the individual is f/fl-e), where 
the subscript i refers to the state of the world (i=C,N) and e is a measure of the individual's 
constant relative risk aversion. Using the definitions of Ic and IN, the expected utility 
maximization can then be solved for the optimum amount of declared income D*. Now 
suppose that D* is calculated for specific, realistic values of the various parameters. For 
example, if (=0.4, f=2, p=0.02, and e=l, then the individual will optimally declare no 
income. Very large values for relative risk aversion are required to generate compliance 
consistent with actual country experience. When e=3, declared income is only 14 percent 
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of true income; when e=5, it is still only 44 percent; when t = 10, it is 71 percent. Risk 
aversion must exceed 30 for compliance to exceed 90 percent. However, existing field 
evidence on the coefficient of relative risk aversion suggests that e ranges between 1 and 2. 
Risk aversion must be abnormally large for behavior to be even roughly comparable to 
actual observed choices, even in many developing and transition countries with low levels 
of compliance. 
13. There are other concepts that describe the same basic phenomenon as social norms, such as 
'psychic cost' (Gordon, 1989), 'tax morale' (Pommerehne et al. 1994), 'moral sentiments' 
(Erard and Feinstein, 1994), group conformity and social customs' (Myles and Naylor, 
1996), and 'intrinsic motivation' (Frey 1997). 
14. Some degree of tax evasion exists in every country. However, when does tax evasion 
become the accepted norm? Practically, nothing is known about the 'critical mass' or the 
'tipping point' of tax evasion, where the social norm of tax compliance switches to one of 
tax evasion. This issue is discussed more fully later. 
15. See, for example, Westat, Inc. (1980), Yankelovich et al. (1984), and Harris and 
Associates, Inc. (1988) for the United States; Vogel (1974) for Sweden; Lewis (1979) for 
the United Kingdom; and de Juan et al. (1994) for Spain. 
16. See also Steenbergen et al. (1992) who model compliance intentions as being a function of 
'general tax beliefs' about the fairness of the tax system and also various 'inhibitors' that 
serve to alter the perception of the acceptability of tax evasion (for example, guilt, social 
sanctions and legal sanctions). 
17. Several of the economists who developed and extended the standard economic model of tax 
evasion have also examined the issue of the optimal enforcement by the tax administration 
agency (Sandmo, 1981; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 1987; Usher, 1986; Kaplow, 1990; Slemrod, 
1990). The important themes of this literature are two. First, tax administration and 
taxpayer compliance costs need to be considered in designing an optimal enforcement 
policy. Second, changes in tax collections stemming from changes in enforcement may be 
a poor guide to the optimal level of enforcement because enforcement uses up real 
resources in the economy while increased collections simply represent a transfer of 
resources. The rule for optimal tax enforcement should therefore equate the marginal 
enforcement cost to the marginal increase in welfare caused by the decrease in excess 
burdens and other costs (including 'anxiety costs') associated with tax evasion. However, 
with the exception of additional resource cost spent on administration and the additional 
revenues generated, all costs and benefits of increased tax enforcement are extremely 
difficult to measure. In this sense, the policy impact of the optimal enforcement literature 
has been limited for developed economies and especially limited for DTCs. 
18. Note that the available evidence from government budgetary information indicates that the 
budget cost of collecting individual income, business income and sales taxes is generally in 
excess of I percent of the revenues from these taxes, and can sometimes be substantially 
higher (Sandford, 1995). However, there is little information on how these costs vary with 
various policy tools. It seems likely that administrative costs change in large and discrete 
amounts with the scale of collections and that they may also display economics of scale in 
their collections, but these aspects of the collection cost technology are not known. 
19. See Bahl (1991) for a discussion of the entire tax reform project. 
20. The exchange rate in 1983 between Jamaican and US dollars was US$ 1 =JS 1.93. At 1983 
exchange rates, the 30 percent bracket applied to the first US$3627 of income, and the 57.5 
percent bracket began at US$7254. Per capita Jamaican income in 1983 was US$1614. 
21. For example, the price of reported income equals [l/(l-t-b)]t where t is the combined 
income and payroll tax rate and b is the payroll benefit rate; that is, a worker must allocate 
[l/(l-t-b)] in gross reported compensation in order to receive one dollar of net reported 
income. Similarly, the price of allowance income is simply one because allowance income 
is not taxed by the income or the payroll tax and it is not eligible for payroll benefits. The 
price of evasion income depends upon whether the worker is audited or not. If the worker 
is caught evading, then [l/(l-ft)] must be spend on gross compensation to receive one 
dollar of net evasion income, where / is penalty rate on unpaid taxes; if the worker is not 
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caught, the price of evasion income is one. The expected price therefore equals (p[l/(l-
ft)]+(l-p)), where p is the probability of detection. 
22. Other empirical evidence from other countries is largely consistent with some of these 
results. For example, estimation results from Dubin and Wilde (1988) suggest that a higher 
audit rate leads to more compliance, with an estimated reported income-audit rate 
elasticity ranging from 0.1 to 0.2. Sheffrin and Triest (1992) examine individual survey 
data, and also find that compliance increases with a greater (perceived) probability of audit. 
23. A maintained hypothesis during the experiments was that risk attitudes were the same in 
the three countries. This was supported by a test of the willingness to bear risk for all 
participating subjects in the three countries. 
24. The experiments in the United States were conducted in three different locations: a 
historical black university, a large state university, and a large private university. 
25. See also Aim et al. (1995) for similar results on the role of social norms, comparing 
Spanish and US subjects. 
26. As stated by Milka Casanegra de Jantscher, an amnesty gives one 'bread for today, hunger 
for tomorrow'. 
27. The name of the State Tax Service was changed in 1999 to the Ministry of Taxation. 
28. This figure excludes contributions to the social extra-budgetary ftinds, and tax collections 
at the federal level do not include tax offsets. 
29. With the exception of government wage arrears, no published data exist on government 
budget arrears. Sundberg and Morozov (1999) report that the new budget arrears at the 
federal level in 1998 were R 24.6 billion and were R 26.4 billion in 1997. At the sub-
national level, budget arrears were R 86.2 billion by February 1999. See also Alfandari and 
Schaffer (1996). 
30. Also included are a dummy variable equal to 1 for December collections and 0 otherwise 
because the month of December in Russia has always been characterized by a strong 
seasonal increase in collections (and a fall in arrears), and real Gross Domestic Product 
because the level of economic activity is expected to affect collections of the various taxes. 
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